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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee. 
v. 
THO:\IAS R. ROBINSON, 
Appellant. 
) 
Case No. 729~' 
Brief for Appellant 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for rape and lite 
sentence by the District Court for Salt Lake County. Hon. 
Ray VanCott, Judge. 
STATEl\1ENT 
Preliminary. This case in its type and outline is strik-
ingly similar to that presented in the recent case of State v 
Williams, 180 Pac. 2nd, 5 51, not yet published in the Utah 
Reports. And we make the same objection to the judgment 
of conviction that was made in that case, viz. error in that: 
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THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
CONVICT. THERE WAS NO LAWFUL EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
AND SENTENCE. 
Before taking up the evidence in detail we pause to men-
tion that the record is not all that could be desired in the way 
of noting objections and exceptions in defendant's behalf hv 
his trial attorney. But there are certain fundamental objec-
tions that are always available to an accused, of which he can-
not be deprived by any act or neglect of an attorney, and 
which he may urge even for the first time in the Supreme 
Court. Among these are the objection that the complaint in 
a civil action, or the information in a criminal case, does not 
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or a crim-
inal offense. The other objection, a corrolary of the first, is 
that there is no evidence to prove cause of action alleged or 
the offense charged. No law authorizes a court to impose 
judgment of conviction on a man and take away his property, 
his liberty or his life where there is no evidence of his guilt. 
And this point may be raised in the Supreme Court for the 
first time, even if there were little or no vigilance shown by 
the defendant's attorney in the trial court. 
Another objection available here is to the repeated and 
persistent use by the State of grossly incompetent evidence 
in making its case. We are aware that in cases where there 
is competent evidence in support of or against a verdict, and 
a party seeks to reinforce or strengthen the competent evi-
dence by incompetent evidence; the other party must object 
to the incompetent evidence at the time, and except to the 
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overruling thereof, in order to assign error to its wrongful 
admission. But in a case where, as here, there is not sufficient 
lawful or competent c\·idence of guilt, the incompetent evi-
dence may be objected to as really no evidence, upon a chal-
lenge to the entire record of eYidence as insufficient, and no 
matter whether it \Yas objected to at the time offered or not. 
And our objection here catches it. 
The Record Story. Avis Barter, the young girl upon 
whom the rape is charged to have been committed, was born 
June 21, 1933 (rec. p. 56-57) and at the time of the offense 
charged on Jan. 6, 1948, she was of the age of 14 years, 6 
months, 16 days. That is, her physical body was that old. But 
her mental growth had been arrested at the age of 5 (56-57, 
61-62, 72). She had entered kindergarten but, owing to her 
backwardness, was transferred to a special class at Jackson 
school for a half year. Then she was dismissed because of 
her inability to absorb instruction. They gave her an I.Q. test 
and a mental rating of a 5-year-old. She cannot read or write. 
Her intellectual perceptions and acts are almost infantile as 
revealed in many of her answers to questions on the witness 
stand. She resides with her parents at No. 432 W. 5th North. 
On Jan. 6, 1948, at about 12:45 p.m., with her mother's 
permission, she left home for a walk over to the home of her 
aunt, Mrs. Brimhall, at No. 1062 West 5th North, some 6 
or 7 blocks to the west. (57, 63-64). She first crossed some 
nearoy railroad tracks on W. 5th North where were working 
some railroad switchmen who knew her and noted her pass-
ing, and then proceeded west, walking in the street to the 
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4 
right of center, because there was no paved sidewalk there. 
~!hen she had reached a point about a quarter of the block 
from the R.R. crossing, a green coupe car pulled up by her 
and stopped. ( 130-132). She was seen to gesture with he: 
hand to the west down the road ( 140). Then the door open-
ed and she got into the car, which proceeded west.When the 
car reached the 5th West crossing of 5th North, it turned 
into a vacant lot or field with tall weeds, and drove in there 
some 150 or 200 feet, but still within sight of the switchmen, 
where it stopped and remained motionless for 40 minutes to 
an hour. Soon after the car entered the vacant lot the switch· 
men, becoming suspicious, turned in an alarm by phone to 
the police station. The latter, in turn, sent out a radio alarm, 
and policemen began to converge, but did not arrive in time 
to catch the occupant of the car. The latter, as soon as he had 
finished with Avis, backed out of the lot, let her out of his 
car at 6th \i\lest, and disappeared. The latter then proceeded 
west with her interrupted walk to her aunt's home and her 
visit there. But she made no mention to her aunt of what hap-
pened to her on the way out until after her father arrived with 
a police officer some 15 or 20 minutes later. (73-76,130-134. 
139-142, 66-69). From her aunt's she was first taken to her 
home, then to the police station,and later to the City Physician. 
She testified to having identified the defendant Robinson as 
her assailant at her home, at the police station, and in the 
District Court room. Since the sufficiency of the evidence 
to convict rests entirely upon the observations and declara· 
tions of this young girl with a mental capacity of a 5-year-old. 
we will examine with some care her performance on the wit· 
ness stand. She testified: 
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In Januai)' 1948 lleft my home to go down to my 
aunt's (72). On the way a green car drove up and he 
pulled me in. The man did not say anything to me. He 
took me into a little field with high weeds and he played 
nasty with 1ne. He unzipped his pants and pulled down 
my pants, and put his thing in me. I told him get off. 
He held me down by my legs. (74-75, 95, 99). 
He was not on me very long. After he got off he 
took me down the road toward my aunt's and let me 
out by some tracks (76). 
CROSS-EX. Yes, I said down stairs (in city court) 
that he was on top of me for an hour. 
Q. How many minutes are there in an hour, Avis? 
A. About three. (100). 
My sister Shirley came out on the street and we 
waved good-bye to each other as she went back to school, 
and I to my aunt's (79). We were right near the R. R. 
tracks along 5th North toward my aunt's. 
CROSS-EX. Q. Had you gotten past 5th West 
by the time this car came up? A. Yes. 
Yes. 
Q. Had you gotten all the way to 6th West? A. 
Q. Had you gotten to 7th West? A. Yes. 
Q. To 8th West? A. Yes. 
Q. To 9th West? A. Yes. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Q. Now 9th West is 4 or 5 blocks from your 
house. Are you sure you had gotten that far before this 
man came up with his car? A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know where lOth West is? A. Yes. 
Q. Had you gotten to lOth West? A. Yes, my 
aunt's house is four blocks from lOth West. Yes, I am 
positive. I have been to lOth West before. It was up 
near I Oth West, where this green car stopped and pulled 
up beside me, and he pulled me in. (81). 
Q. And this was all the way to lOth West? A. 
Yes (92). 
Q. How many blocks were you from your horne 
when this man pulled up? A. Oh, it was about two. 
(99). 
Avis was badly mixed in her head, not in heart. As an) 
city map will show, lOth West is less than one block from her 
aunt's home, No. 1062 lOth West, not four blocks as she 
said. And the man pulled up and took her in his car at only 
about one-quarter of a block from her home, according to the 
near-by switchmen who noticed the occurrence and alerted 
police headquarters ( 130-132). Also the man took her into 
the vacant lot of weeds just over the first intersection at 5th 
\Vest where they could still see the car top as it stood motion-
less ( 130-13 2, 140), not so far away as I Oth West as she 
said she was positive. Also there are no railroad tracks at or 
near I Oth West Street, at which she could have been let out 
of the car, as she said in her account of it. But there are R.R. 
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tracks at the 5th \Vest and 5th 0Jorth crossing, as any city 
map will show. This is not to disparage her conscious vera· 
city, but to show the scope of her intellectual perceptions-
those of a five-year-old. 
I was going down to my aunt's and a green car 
drove up, that one in the seat and one in front, etc. 
(other details, 73-75). 
CROSS-EX. It was a coupe. Yes I remember down 
stairs (city court) I said the car had two doors on each 
side. It did have two doors and two handles on each side, 
yes. (78-79). 
The witness was then shown and identified trial exhibits 
A, B, C, D and E, photographs of a car with only one door on 
each side. Again, deficient intellectual perceptions, or else 
confusion from cars she had seen since the rape. 
After he got off me he took me down the road and 
let me off by some tracks (76). I went on to my aunt's 
and was there till my daddy and a policeman came and 
took me home (77). 
To a person of norm.al perceptions 14 or 15 years of age, 
a great tragedy had happened to Avis Barter, that would hav~ 
prompted her to return instantly to her home only a block oc 
so away and report the occurence to her mother. What did she 
do? She resumed her interrupted walk down to her aunt's, 
Mrs. Brimhall, some six blocks further west, as if there had 
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been only a casual stop to chat with a friend. Arriving at her 
aunt's she did not tell her aunt what had happened, though 
a little shy and nervous, until her father came with a police-
man to take her away. Then she told her aunt that a man had 
played nasty with her. ( 6 7-71). ' 
There should have been a special preliminary inquiry 
by counsel into the mental capacity of this girl to testify be-
fore putting her upon the witness stand, as was done in the 
case of State v. \Villiams, ISO P. 2d., 551. In that case such 
a hearing was had, the inquiry going to mental capacity of 
the witness (I) to understand and answer questions intelli-
gently, and (2) to show her moral responsibility and sense 
of duty to accurately narrate the facts within her knowledge 
and recollection; that is-speak the truth. An absence of 
capacity in either of these particulars would disqualify the 
witness to testify. 
The result of this preliminary inquiry in the \Villi~ms 
case was found by this Court, upon the record, to be not very 
satisfactory, lacking in clarity. But this Court allowed the 
trial court's decision to stand, in permitting the witness to 
testify. Dut the judgment of conviction was reversed for in· 
sufficiency of all the evidence, including that of the prose-
cuting witness, to convict. In that case, as in this, the pro-
secuting witness was the only witness to the physical acts and 
circumstances supporting the charge of rape. In that case, 
as in this, the prosecuting witness pointed out and identified 
the accused as the person who raped her. In that case the 
mental age of the witness was 8 to I 0. Here it was 5. 
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It may be that the framing of questions to properly probe 
the witness' mental workings might have been of some diffi-
culty or ingenunity: requiring some skill, patience and gentle-
ness-some experience in such cases. The aid of the teachers 
and doctors who made the original I.Q. test when the girl 
was let out of school, might perhaps have been invoked 
They acquire a certain skill in such matters from routine 
work. Nothing was done: no inquiry made-
If there was a duty to conduct such a preliminary in-
quiry, it would seem to have been a responsibility of the Court 
as well as of counsel, in the interest of justice. Or, if not, 
then of the State's counsel, before offering the witness. 
Counsel has some obligation to the public to see that justice 
is done, as well as the duty to obtain convictions; yes, even 
to an accused person himself, that he may not suffer if inno-
cent. 
In this case, this Court is not called upon, as in the Wil-
liams case, to defer to the judgment of the trial court in pass-
ing on the result of such inquiry into the mental capacity of 
the prosecuting witness. No hearing was had and the court':. 
judgment was not invoked or exercised, unless silently in ac-
cepting the verdict and pronouncing judgment of conviction. 
It will not do to suggest that, in the absence of objection, the 
trial court was warranted in passing it over, and taking no 
notice of a witness's mental infancy or imbecility. The fact~ 
in that regard were known to the State and were put upon 
the record at the very inception of its evidence. Suppose the 
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mental age of Avis Barter had been only 4 years, or 3, could 
the court and counsel ignore it and say that there was some 
evidence to support the verdict, foreclosing further inquiry 
under the rule of conflicting evidence? This Court said Nay 
in the Williams case, where the mental age was 8 to 10 years, 
and reversed the conviction. 
We now leave the witness Avis Barter, and take up other 
witnesses for the State. Dr. C. R. Openshaw made a physical 
examination of Avis during the afternoon of Jan. 6, 1948. 
and found sperm or male semen in her vagina, proving recent 
sexual connection, but not who left the semen there. Ther,: 
was rupture of the hymen, in his opinion not recent, but no 
bruise, laceration, torn clothing, or evidence of rough handl-
ing. (7-ll). 
Reuben Jacobs, a railroad switchman, was on Jan. 6, 
1948 working at the 5th North and 4th West crossing, direct-
ing traffic, signing trains through, lining switches, and giv-
ing signals. Has a near-by switchmen's shanty (130). On 
that day between 12 and I p. m. he observed Avis Barter pass 
him by going west on 5th North street, and saw her walking 
up the road a little to one side of the center of the road. When 
she was only about a quarter of a block west of him, he saw :.1 
green coupe pull up close to her; the door opened and she got 
into the car ( 131) on the north side of it. Then the car drove 
on, and when he next looked that way he saw the top of the 
car among some tall weeds in a vacant lot almost a block from 
where she had got into the car, and just north of 5th North 
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~lv associate, ~lr. Locke. turned in a call to the police depart-
m~nt (132). Later the police caine but the car had gone. It 
had remained there between 40 minutes and an hour ( I3 3). 
I have known Avis Barter by sight for several years playing 
around in the street where we worked, and knew where she 
lived ( 134). 
VVilliam S. Smith, crossing switchman, was working 
with Reuben Jacobs, at the same time and place, and his tes-
timony agreed with that of Jacobs (139-141). 
Incompetent Testimony. The foregoing is a summary 
of all the testimony of witnesses purporting to know anything 
that happened before Avis Barter arrived at her aunt's home, 
1062 \V. 5th North, after the criminal attack upon her. 
There was some incompetent testimony, consisting of state-
ments of what the witnesses saw Avis Barter do, and say, at 
specified times and places before the trial, and after the as-
serted attack upon her. That is, they saw and heard A vis pick 
out and identify the defendant and his Hudson car as those 
involved in the attack upon her on Jan. 6, 1948. Instances: 
Victor R. Heath, police (106); Chas. W. Farnsworth, police 
(122-125; and 127); Alice Barter, mother, (58); Avis Barter, 
girl, (78-79, 92). 
It is a commonplace in the law of evidence, to say that 
the acts, statements and declarations of a testifying witness 
made previous to the trial, not under oath, in the absence of 
the party to be affected, are incompetent on the trial of an 
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issue against him. If Avis Barter is a qualified witness, she 
may testify under oath to material facts at the trial. But the 
State may not reinforce her testimony by having her testify 
that she had made similar or supporting statements before the 
trial. Neither may other persons so testify. The only in-
stances in which such prior acts or declarations of a witness 
are admissible, is when they tend to contradict or disparage 
his statements on the witness stand. Never in support. In 
certain accident cases they are permitted, if they are expres-
sions of instant pain. Or when made to a physician to enable 
him to diagnose and prescribe. Not otherwise. We won't 
take the time to hunt up and cite the cases on this point, 
since this Court is necessarily familiar with them. Certainly 
in this case such statements, reeking of hearsay, have no evi-
dential value in this record. The identification of defendant 
as her assailant rests solely on what she testifed at the trial 
Chronology of the Case. In view of the evidence to be 
cited later, showing that defendant Thomas R. Robinson was 
elsewhere than at or near the scene of the offense charged 
against him, and so could not have committed it, it becomes 
important to determine precisely the time of day-the hour 
of the day-that the crime was in process of being committed, 
according to the State's witnesses. And that means the space 
of time after Avis Barter left her mother's home, 432 West 
5th North, until she arrived at her aunt's home, No. 1062 "\1\1• 
5th North. 
Her mother, Alice Barter, testified that: 
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Avis left my hon1e to go to my sister's horne on Jan. 
6th, 1948, at between 12:30 and l p. rn. I next saw her 
at about 2 p. rn. when my husband and an officer 
brought her back from my sister's house (56-57 and 62). 
It was about 12:-+5 o'clock when Shirley and Avis 
left my horne and waved at each other as they were 
crossing the tracks ( 63-64). 
~Irs. Brimhall, aunt of Avis: 
I live at 1062 W. 5th North. On Jan. 6th, 1948, 
Avis came to•rny house at about a quarter to 2 p.m. (67). 
Her father and police officer Heath came to my house 
at 2 p. m., which was feeding time for my baby (69). 
1 aim to keep in touch with my baby's feeding time by 
the clock, and on that day I believe it was I :45 p. m. 
when Avis came to my house. It takes 20, to 25 or 30 
minutes to walk from my house to my sister's, Mrs. Bar-
ter's (71 ). 
Reuben Jacobs, switchman: 
On Jan. 6, 1948, while working at my post of duty 
at. 5th North and 4th \Vest, I saw Avis Barter after noon, 
between 12 and l p. 1n. as she passed us, going west on 
5th North. She was alone walking up the road a little 
to one side of the middle of the road. When she reacheLl 
a point about 1h of a block west of us, we saw a green 
coupe car pull up to her, and she got into the car on the 
north side. Then the car went west, and I next saw the 
top of it in some weeds in a vacant lot, almost a block 
from where she got in. My associate, Mr. Locke, phon-
ed the police, and later the police came, but the car had 
gone ( 130-132). 
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I should judge the car remained there 40 minutes 
to an hour (133-134). 
Our noon period begins at 12 o'clock and we have 
twenty minutes noon time. It began that day at or pretty 
close to 12. VVe took about 20 minutes, and we had 
finished our noon hour before I saw this green car. And 
it was about 20 minutes later when I saw the green car. 
That brings us to around 12:45 p. m. when I saw the 
green car, yes. That is my best judgment ( I34-I35). 
From the time that I saw the car in the weeds of the va-
cant lot I thought it remained there for 40 minutes to an 
hour, which would bring it to around I: 30 p. m. or a 
little later. That weed patch is at 5th North and 5th 
West. 5th \i\lest don't cross 5th North there, only there 
is a R. R. spur in there to supply spur cars for the rail-
road ( I36-I38). 
\i\lm. S. Smith, switchman: 
I imagine it was, as Mr. Jacobs says, 45 minutes to 
an hour that the car was over in that vacant lot where 
we saw it stop (145). 
Victor R. Heath, police: 
The radio report I heard stated that the information 
was received at the police station by the dispatcher, at 
12: 59 p. m. It was around I o'clock when I heard the 
call on the air. I was then near 7th South, west of Main, 
in the southwest part of town (108-109). 
According to all the foregoing, the raping began at or 
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\'ery soon after 12. i-5 p. m. and was consumated at or before 
l: 30 p. m., so that Avis would have enough time to walk 
from the tracks at 5th North and 5th \Vest to the home of 
her aunt (l\Irs. Brimhall) at No. I062 W. 5th North, about 
six blocks, and arrive there by about I: i-5 p. m., or I5 minute~ 
or so before l\ Irs. Brimhall's feeding time for her baby, which 
was 2 p.m. (69). The first point of time that any witness for 
the State saw the defendant Robinson that day was at about 
or between 2: IS p. m. and 2:30 p. m. when he was taken 
into custody by officer Howard Mulligan at a point described 
by him as on 6th \Vest, just over the railroad tracks, headed 
north from 5th North ( II2-113). 
I asked him a few questions, and he stated that he 
was on his way to the Griffin Wheel Co. to seek employ-
ment. I told him to drive back up the street with me, I 
wanted to make a check on him. By that time officer 
Bukosky had come up from the rear, and we had him 
tum his car around and go back to the residence at 432 
W. 5th North. (Mulligan, 113). 
He also told me that he had been out to Magna 
and Garfield looking for work (Mulligan, I15). 
I heard officer Mulligan question defendant. He 
said he had been driving around looking for work; that 
he had been out to Garfield and Magna looking for 
work, and that he was on his way to the Griffin Wheel 
Co. looking for work. (Bukosky, 120). 
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I discussed the case with defendant shortly after 
5 p. m. in the city jail. 1 asked him if he knew what he 
had been arrested for, and he said, No, he didn't. I 
asked him if he had had a little girl in his car and as-
saulted her. l-Ie said he couldn't have had her in his car 
because he had been out to Magna and Garfield looking 
for work that day, and then to that place on 9th South 
in the vicinity of 6th or 7th West, and also to the Griffin 
Wheel. I asked him if that was down in the vicinity of 
6th West and 5th North, and he said Yes. (Officer 
Farnsworth, 126- I 27). 
The foregoing contains mention of all of the State's wit-
nesses testifying to matters occurring at or before the arrest, 
and one witness, Farnsworth, as to an interview occurring 
after the arrest. 
In agreement with the testimony of police officers Mul-
ligan, Bukosky and Farnsworth, as to what defendant Robin-
son told them on the day of his arrest as to his whereabouts 
at the time of the raping, is the testimony of the following 
gentlemen who were called to the witness stand by the de-
fense: 
William J. Hicks: 
I live at the Arthur plant, Magna; am employed by 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, as supervisor of all per-
sonnel. My duties are interviewing, employing and sep-
arting men from service. On Jan. 6, 1948, Tom Robin-
son came to me seeking employment; he is the gentle-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
man seated here at your right. At our plant we all go to 
lunch by the whistle signals. The whistle sounds for 
-lunch at ll: 30. It blows again at 12 to return to work. 
I had gone to lunch and returned at from 5 to l 0 min-
utes after the return whistle had blown. Then I went 
out on an errand for about 12 to 15 minutes business. 
Then returning to my office I was informed that a couple 
of gentlemen wished to see me. Then it was about 5 
minutes before I went out to the counter to meet them; 
and the first one I talked to was this gentleman here, 
Torn Robinson (148-150). 
(Author's Nate: Within the above rnaximun1 
and minimum limits, Mr. Hicks began his interview 
with defendant at from 22 to 30 minutes after 12 
o'clock). 
Robinson had worked for us in 1929 for 3 or 4 
months as core maker. I had some conversation with 
him for between 7 and 10 minutes. Then he went out 
of the door and that is the last I saw of him ( 150). 
(Nate: This adds up to between 12:29 and 
12:40 p. m. when Robinson left Mr. Hicks' office). 
I drive into Salt Lake City almost daily. I have 
clocked the time on 21st South, driving at about 42 to 
45 miles an hour and coming by way of 21st South and 
Redwood Road; 3rd South to lOth West; lOth West to 
2nd South; and 2nd South to West Temple at 2nL1 
South - about 30 minutes. On 3500 South, about 40 
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minutes. On the speedway about 5 minutes less-
35 minutes ( 151). 
I wrote Robinson's name on a date tab in my office 
when he was there on Jan. 6, 1948. I still have that date 
tab, and have since verified the date from that ( 152). 
After 1929 when Robinson worked for us, I had 
never seen or associated with him until Jan. 6, 1948, 
when he called. I then knew him by face but could not 
recall his name ( 1 53). 
George M. Adamson: 
1 am Chief Clerk of Employment at Garfield Smel-
ter; have been for 28 years. On Jan. 6, 1948, I saw Tom 
Robinson in our employment office, just about ll30 
p. m. or a minute or so before 12:30. I had with him 1 
general conversation regarding employment. He applied 
for a job as welder. At the time I told him we were not 
hiring welders. He then told me h~ had worked there 
before, and I went to get his record out of the dead file. 
I told him his record was good but that we were not hir-
ing at the time. Advised him to go see Mr. Hicks at 
Kennecott Copper. I believe he was there with me for 
about ten minutes that day. It was very close to 12:40 
p.m. when he left. My assistant, Mr. Kelsey Rosander, 
was present there with me at the time (166-167). 
I never saw Mr. Robinson before Jan. 6, 1948, tu 
my knowledge and am not related to him (168). It is 
about a mile and a half from mv office to Mr. Hicks'. 
(169). ' 
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CROSS-EX. A.re you testifying your recollection 
of an approximate ti1ne Robinson was there? A. No, sir; 
it is a definite time, because the whistle blows at 12: 30 
out there to finish the lunch hour. He was in the office 
when the whistle blew, and he had been in the office a 
minute or so before that time. We hadn't gone back to 
work from lunch. There might be an error of a minute 
or so in fixing the ti1ne, not more ( 170-1 71). 
Kelsey A. Rosander: 
I am assistant safety director, and know Mr. George 
Adamson. I saw Tom Robinson on Jan. 6, 1948, 
at the American Smelting & Refining Co.'s employment 
office. He was there just as we were finishing lunch. 
Mr. Adamson interviewed him about employment. He 
was there with us about 10 minutes. He left at about 5 
or 6 minutes after the 12: 30 whistleblew, ending our 
lunch period. Yes, I recall specifically hearing the 
whistle blow. I never saw Robinson before Jan. 6, and 
I am not related to him ( 173-175). 
Aaron Hill: 
I live at 174 Parker St., Murray, Utah. My business 
is driving a truck, but for the last year I have been a 
laborer. 
I saw Tom Robinson here on Jan. 6, 1948 out at 
the Chicago Steel Bridge & Iron Co. on 17th South and 
about 5th West. I had never seen him before, and have 
seen him but once since. The hour I saw him there was 
about 1 : 20 or I : 30 p.m. I had just returned from Idaho 
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visiting my father who was ill. I got in Monday night, 
Jan. 5, and 1 went there Tuesday at about l p.m. to seek 
employment. 1 had been there, oh, 15 to 20 minutes 
when Mr. Robinson drove up; he also was seeking em-
ployment ( 157-159). 
I asked him, if he didn't make the job there, if he 
wanted to go out to Magna and Garfield and try there? 
He said No use, he had just come back from there, noth-
ing doing. 
At that time I did not know his name. I would say 
he was there a half hour or longer at the Chicago Bridge 
& Iron Co. While there we talked with Ray Duckworth, 
sup't. for the Olson Construction Co. I am not related 
to Robinson or any of his -family, and don't know them. 
I am positive as to the time we were there, to within 
15 minutes, I would say. I ate my dinner at about 
12:30 p. m. at Murray, and then drove in from l\1urray 
to the job as soon as I had finished my dinner at home. 
That would bring me there at approximately 1 p. m., 
and I left there approximately at 2 p. m. ( 159-164 ). 
The foregoing covers completely all of the time that 
defendant was supposed to be engaged in committing a rape 
upon the little girl in this case. It shows that the defendant 
could not possibly have committed the offense charged be-
cause he was not there at the- time and place proved in the 
State's evidence. The defendant did not go upon the witness 
stand in person to testify. The State's evidence made it un-
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necessary. That is, the St,ltc by proving with its own wit-
nesses th~lt the defendant clain1s in defense that he was else-
where seeking work at the time, and telling the jury so, made 
it unnecessary for defendant to himself tell the jury the same 
facts. If he had testified, he could but ha,·e repeated the same 
statements that the State's witnesses had imputed to him. H.: 
would not n·ant to deny those statements because they were 
true. And they served the purposes of his defense as well as 
if he had himself made them on the stand, or better. 
The defendant could not have proved his own pnor 
self-serving statements in defense. The State alone com-
mitted that error, as we have seen (ante page 11-12). But 
when the State praYed them for him, he was entitled to the 
benefit thereof. Especially is this true of the testimony of 
Officer Farnsworth who testified for the State to his conver-
sation with defendant in the city jail as a substantiYe fact in 
the case. Thereby the State is bound as by a statement in 
the evidence vouched for, sanctioned and inspired by it. 
If not to the extent of admitting defendant's innocence, 
then certainly to the extent of proving that that was de-
fendant's defense. By putting these officers on the stand 
and causing them to testify as they did, the State is bound 
to admit the competence thereof, and that it has some value as 
evidence in the case, even if against the State. This is not 
a case where defendant had made other conflicting state-
ments which the State sought to contradict or disparage 
before the jury. But they were original evidence for the 
State, both that on direct and cross-examination of its wit-
nesses. 
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Independently of this feature of the case, the State 
has submitted no lawful evidence of the offense charged. 
As in the Williams case, this court is confronted with 
impeccable evidence that defendant was not present at 
the time and place of the rape, and so could not have com-
mitted it. The State ha)gotten the wrong pig by the ears, and 
should release him. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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